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Essay on External Imbalances within the Euro Area 
 
Abstract 
 
Current accounts of individual members of the Euro Area were not expected to 
dramatically diverge, however during the last decade they have sharply diverged as 
peripheral Member States are experiencing very high and unprecedented current 
account deficits. This paper tests the relationship in the medium and short run between 
the current account and i) Fiscal policy and ii) inward Foreign Direct Investment, two 
elements suggested as partial causes for the large external imbalances. 
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I - Introduction: 
 The recent Sovereign debt crisis directed our attention towards the large and 
persistent current account deficits presented by peripheral Euro Area countries. Even 
though the Euro was considered a success by most politicians, after its launch it has 
been noticed an unprecedented divergence between individual Member States external 
accounts. At least since 2000 Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (the so-called "PIGS", 
clearly not a favorable designation) have all
1
 been running current account deficits, as 
shown in the figure below: 
Figure 1. 
 
Source: IMF. 
 As it can be observed, over the last few years the difference between the German 
and the peripheral countries' current account balances is much higher than in the Pre-
EMU period. Since the European Monetary Union was established and the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism II was applied, the current account balances of the peripheral countries 
have been sharply deteriorating. The elimination of currency and liquidity risks and the 
                                                             
1 Except for Ireland in 2003. 
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fostering of financial integration represented a major shock for the peripheral Euro Area 
countries (Lane, 2011), creating an environment suitable for a credit boom, a spree in 
private consumption and a decrease in private savings (Blanchard, 2007). As a 
consequence, over the last few years current account deficits reached alarming and 
unprecedented levels, raising the debate on the potential threats to the peripheral 
European economies and their viability within the Euro zone. Christodoulakis (2009) 
recalls that even though there is not a benchmark level at which a current account deficit 
would cause an economy-wide crisis, the Balance of Payments crisis in Latin America 
took place with CA deficits between 6 and 8% of GDP. Due to the fact that these 
current account deficits have not only been large but also persistent, peripheral Euro 
Area Member States experienced a rapid accumulation of external debt. According to 
the Economist (2011), Greece currently has a total external debt of 180% of GDP while 
Portugal, the last Euro Area country to request a bail-out, has already outstanding debts 
to foreigners that are larger than twice its national income. To better understand the 
implications that such large external deficits may have on the countries' individual 
Economies, Figure 2 shows the ratio of the current account deficit to total investment
2
 
in six of the original Euro Area countries. This ratio can be perceived as an indicator of 
risk associated with the easiness of the country's financing from abroad. 
 
 
 
                                                             
2 It is useful to recall the basic identity: 
          , which tell us that total investment is equal to the sum of domestic savings (private and 
public) and external savings, represented by the negative current account. This way this ratio tells us the 
share of domestic investment that is financed by external savings. 
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Figure 2. Foreign Ownership of Capital Formation. 
 
Source: World Bank, OECD and own calculations. 
 
 As it can be seen in Figure 2, there is a clear upward trend in the post-EMU 
period, especially during the 2003-2008 period for the peripheral Member States. 
Although this indicator does not have an explicit interpretation for Germany, since it is 
running a current account surplus, it is still interesting to see the large difference relative 
to the other Member States. Greece, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Ireland and Spain 
are in a very difficult situation. In these countries the financing of investment depends 
crucially on the availability of international credit. A pull-out by international investors 
would have disastrous consequences for the present and future of these troubled 
economies. 
 External imbalances were not expected to diverge sharply within the Euro Area, 
as the Stability and Growth Pact does not even contain explicit references regarding the 
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individual Member States' current account balances. As the deficit-prone Member States 
are also the ones falling behind in terms of per capita income, they may be forced to 
undertake structural reforms to boost competitiveness and foster growth, as there is no 
autonomous monetary and exchange rate policy. 
 
Why should we care about the Current Account of an individual Member State of 
the EMU? 
 Another important discussion arises from this debate. Under a common currency 
what is foreign and what is domestic? As Ingram (1973) states, under a monetary union 
a deficit or a surplus in an individual Member State Current Account becomes 
"blurred", since short run imbalances among Member States could be financed through 
financial markets, without any action by the monetary authority. Then, why should we 
pay attention to the Current Account balance of an individual Member State of the 
EMU when these statistics are not even available for any of the American Federation 
states, such as Massachusetts or Illinois? Markets do distinguish between these 
monetary unions, as seen during the recent sovereign debt crisis. It is no coincidence 
that the countries under attack over the last year had also extremely weak foreign 
positions. Besides this, European corporate bonds usually include a country risk 
component, while in the US firms are not differentiated by the State in which they 
operate. In a recent paper, Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) try to answer this intriguing 
fact with two major points. Firstly, there is a higher labor mobility within the US than 
within the EMU. Secondly, the EMU is not a federation as the US, but an association of 
fully sovereign states. There is not Union legislation regarding national budgets and 
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taxation, with each Member State remaining a separate jurisdiction. Even though that 
under a common currency the notion of an individual Member State's foreign position 
becomes somehow "blurred", it is not enough to completely dismiss that concept. 
 So even though there is no exchange rate risk, Euro Area countries with large 
Current Account deficits should definitely worry. Why? Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon 
(2010) enumerate three main points to answer this question. Firstly because it may 
reflect domestic distortions, such as the low net savings caused by transitory asset 
pricing booms (as in Spain) or fantastic growth expectations
3
 (Portugal in 1995-2001). 
Secondly because gradual adjustment can be extremely hard, as external deficits due to 
a lack of competitiveness and/or overheating would require a period of slow growth 
during its rebalancing. Thirdly, if financing becomes extremely expensive (Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal case over the last year) there can be an abrupt, instead of gradual, 
adjustment.  
 
Why was this disregarded before? 
 Even though such imbalances could be a threat to the sustainability of the Euro 
Area, policymakers did not pay much attention to it at the time the EMU was 
established. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) considered that the large Current Account 
deficits within the EMU were "benign" and after analyzing the Greek and the 
Portuguese case, they conclude that their national authorities should not worry and take 
any measures to reduce their external deficits. Using an intertemporal model they show 
that for a Euro Zone converging country foreign borrowing was optimal. Current 
                                                             
3 For an extensive analysis of the Portuguese situation during the first 10 years of the EMU see Blanchard 
(2007(1)) 
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account deficits were a natural side-effect of the catching-up process. However, while 
Greece and Spain could fit this approach, the same does not happen with Ireland and 
Portugal. When Ireland started running Current Account deficits its per capita income 
was already above the Euro Area average, while the Portuguese per capita income has 
become rather stagnant since 2001, despite Portugal has been having an average current 
account deficit around 10 percentage points of GDP. The public debate over the 
dangerous implications of large external imbalances to the individual Member Sates' 
economies and to the Euro Area as a whole only begun when current account deficits 
achieved persistent and alarming levels over the last few years. Blanchard (2007) 
completely changed his opinion, stating that Portugal and Spain should worry and act as 
soon as possible as the implications of such large deficits would be disastrous. With no 
monetary authority, the peripheral Member States may be forced to leave the union in 
order to perform a massive devaluation. 
 This paper tests two hypotheses suggested by previous studies as partial causes 
for the large external imbalances within the Euro Area. The first one considers that such 
large imbalances are a result of fiscal profligacy while the second one argues that the 
divergence in external accounts between Member States is also related with differences 
in the sector destination of inward Foreign Direct Investment. 
 The structure of this paper is as follows: Section II will explore previously 
suggested partial causes for the large and persistent current account deficits while 
section III will empirically test them. Section IV sums up and concludes. 
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II - Fiscal Policy and The Role of Inward FDI 
 This section explores two theories for the divergence in external positions 
advanced by previous studies: low public savings and differences in inward FDI 
patterns. 
 
Fiscal Policy and the Current Account 
 This has been a very discussed subject over the last thirty years. Theoretically, 
the main channels through which fiscal policy can affect the current account are: 
 Direct impact on aggregate demand: As the Government accounts for a large 
share of the domestic demand, following a Keynesian framework a fiscal 
expansion will tend to boost aggregate demand, increasing imports and 
deteriorating the trade balance. 
 The real exchange rate: Fiscal policy can also have an impact on the real 
exchange rate (and consequently on the trade balance) by changing the relative 
price of non-tradables. A higher level of Government consumption is likely to 
appreciate a country's real exchange rate due to the fact that such consumption 
tends to fall more on non-tradables than on tradables (De Gregorio et. al, 1994). 
This real appreciation can shift private consumption towards and production 
away from tradables, damaging the current account balance. 
 Interest rates and country risk premia:  According to Abbas et. al (2010), a 
"controlled" fiscal balance can reduce interest rates including on debt hold by 
foreigners, improving the current account balance. However, at the same time, 
lower country risk premia can also trigger higher capital inflows, which can 
10 
 
stimulate aggregate demand and put an upward pressure on domestic prices, 
worsening the current account balance. Therefore, the net impact will depend on 
specific characteristics of each economy. 
 In terms of empirical testing, there is a large spectrum of methods used. Most 
studies use simple panel regressions and estimate the medium-run relationship between 
the fiscal balance and the current account, finding evidence that larger fiscal deficits are 
associated with higher external deficits. Estimates suggest that the increase of the fiscal 
deficit by 1 percentage point of GDP is associated with a current account balance 
worsening between 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points of GDP (Gruber and Kamin, 2005; 
Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon, 2010; Lee et. al., 2008). However all these estimations 
consider panels composed by advanced and developing countries. When similar 
estimations are conducted only for developed (Chinn and Prasad, 2003) or just 
European countries (Abiad et al., 2009) this relationship between the current account 
and the fiscal balance seems not to be statistically significant. A recent approach is the 
one followed by Abbas et. al (2010), which uses a panel VAR technique to estimate the 
relationship between government consumption and the current account. Their results 
suggest that there is a negative relationship between both indicators, even though the 
authors also use a dataset which includes countries in different stages of development.  
 Figures 3 and 4 present the medium term relation between the current account 
and two fiscal policy indicators, the fiscal balance and the growth rate of government 
consumption for eleven of the twelve original Euro Area Member States (Luxembourg 
will not be considered throughout this paper). As the presented relation is a medium-run 
one, all observations are 4-year non-overlapping averages from 1982 to 2009. 
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 Figure 3. Current Account vs. Fiscal Balance 
 
 Figure 4. Current Account vs. Government Consumption 
 
 Source (for both Figures 3 and 4): OECD, IMF, AMECO and own calculations. 
 Figure 3 suggest that there is a positive and significant relationship between the 
fiscal balance and the external account. Figure 4 shows that the current account and the 
growth of government consumption are negatively related, in line with the theory 
presented above. 
 The estimation of the relationship between Fiscal policy and the current account 
would be very interesting not only to understand what happened before but also to 
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analyze the relationship of the external account and the only remaining autonomous 
macroeconomic policy instrument of Euro Area Member states. 
 
The Pattern of Inward Foreign Direct Investment 
 This theory suggests that the divergence in external accounts within the Euro 
Area can be partially attributed to differences in the pattern of inward FDI destination 
between Northern and Southern individual Member States. Christodoulakis (2009) 
presented a theoretical model in which he states that inward Foreign Direct Investment 
in the Euro Area has been mainly directed to the tradable sector in the North and to the 
non-tradable sector in the South. This way, inward FDI tends to increase the traded 
output relatively to the non-traded output, improving the current account balance in the 
Northern countries. In the opposite direction, in the Southern countries it shifts the 
composition of output towards the non-tradable sector (as for instance, construction). 
This reduces traded output and boosts aggregate demand, raising the price level and 
appreciating the Real Exchange Rate. This way the differentiation in the structure and 
the composition of the Economy in terms of Foreign Direct Investment can explain part 
of the divergence in current account balances within the Euro zone. In order to test this 
theory, Table 1 shows the difference of the ratio between the tradable sector and the 
non-tradable sector capital-labour ratios
4
 (both computed relatively to 1995) with the 
Euro Area average for nine
5
 Euro Area Member States from 1995 to 2005. 
                                                             
4
 Industries were classified according to a division presented in Schmillen (2010). The industries 
considered to belong to the Tradable sector were: (1) Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; (2) 
Mining and quarrying; (3) Total Manufacturing; (4) Transport, storage and communication; (5) Finance, 
Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services. The industries considered to be non-tradable were: (1) 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply; (2) Construction; (3) Wholesale and Retail trade; (4) Hotels and 
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Table 1. Difference of the ratio between Tradable and Non-Tradable sectors' Capital-labour 
ratios with Euro average. 
Country/Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Austria 0 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.18 
Belgium 0 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.15 
Finland 0 0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.09 -0.11 
France 
    
0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Germany 0 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Italy 0 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.12 -0.15 -0.17 -0.18 -0.17 
Netherlands 0 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Portugal 0 -0.06 -0.12 -0.15 -0.24 -0.25 -0.18 -0.17 -0.18 -0.15 -0.16 
Spain 0 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Source: EU KLEMS, Eurostat and own calculations 
 From the table above we cannot observe a clear distinction between Northern 
and Southern Member States as Christodoulakis (2009) would predict, due to the 
Finnish and French situations. If we consider the year of 2005, what we can easily 
distinguish are peripheral from central countries. In Finland, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
the ratio between the tradable and non-tradable capital-labour ratios seems to have 
worsen relatively to the Euro Area average. 
 Figure 5 presents the long term correlation between inward FDI and the current 
account balance for each country group for the period 1982-2009.  The results show that 
in both groups inward FDI and the current account balance appear to be positively 
related, although in neither the coefficient is statistically significant. However the 
relationship seems to be stronger in the North than in the South. Even though these 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Restaurants; (5) Public administration and Defense; (6) Education; (7) Health and Social work; (8) Other 
community, social and personal services. 
The average capital-labour ratio for the tradable sector was computed as a real Gross Value Added 
weighted-average of the capital-labour ratio (relative to 1995) for each of the tradable sector industries. 
The same method is used for the average non-tradables capital-labour ratio. 
 
5 These ratios are not available for Greece and Ireland. The EU KLEMS database does not have data of 
the Greek industries capital inputs and the Eurostat does not collect the real GVA for Ireland. 
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results do not suggest a negative relationship between inward Foreign Direct Investment 
and the current account balance for the Southern countries, the fact that this relationship 
is stronger in the Northern Member States still does not dismiss the possibility that the 
divergence in external accounts between both groups can be partially attributed to 
inward FDI. 
 Figure 5.      
 
 Source: IMF and UNCTAD. 
 
III - A Quantitative Analysis 
Medium-Run Estimation 
 To look at the relation between the above mentioned variables and the current 
account in the medium term in the original Euro Area Member States
6
, the following 
specification was run: 
 
  
   
     
   
      
     
      
                                            
                                           (1) 
                                                             
6 Except Luxembourg. 
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 The dependent variable in (1) is the current account balance measured in 
percentage points of GDP. A positive observation corresponds to a surplus and a 
negative one to a deficit. Since we are estimating a medium term relationship, we use 4-
year non-overlapping averages of the current account balance constructed over the 
period 1982-2009 in order to filter high-frequency fluctuations, giving a maximum of  
seven observations per Member State. This data-averaging method has been used by 
Abiad et al. (2010), Chinn and Prasad (2003), Gruber and Kamin (2003), Jaumotte and 
Sodsriwiboon (2010) and Lee et al. (2008), as well as most of the control variables 
used. According to the specification, the current account balance in percentage points of 
GDP of country i in time t depends on a common time effect
7
, the fiscal balance in 
percentage points of GDP of country i in time t, two crossed terms between the lagged 
growth rate of inward FDI as share of GDP expressed in percentage points and a 
dummy to determine if the country belongs to the Northern or the Southern group and 
on a group of control variables included in the vector    . In the basic specification are 
used seven control variables: Firstly, the country's Net Foreign Asset position expressed 
in GDP percentage points measured in the year before the period of reference of the 
current account balance
8
. A country's NFA affects the current account balance as it 
affects its net investment income directly. Secondly, the lagged growth rate of real PPP-
adjusted GDP per capita expressed in percentage points as used in Abiad et. al (2010). 
According to Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), catching up Euro Area economies should 
                                                             
7 No fixed effects were used in both the short and medium term estimations. Although it would allow to 
capture time-invariant features of each country, however, according to Barro (1997), Lane (2000) and 
Chinn and Prasad (2003), the use of fixed effects relies on time-series information within countries, 
eliminating the cross-sectional information. Since the cross-section information is still very important and 
most of the independent variables show large variability across countries, the regressions did not include 
country-fixed effects. 
8 For instance, if the current account is being evaluated in the period 1994-1997, the NFA observation 
corresponds to the value observed in the year of 1993. 
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run current account deficits, since external borrowing would be optimal. This way we 
should expect a coefficient with a negative sign. The third control variable is the 
contemporaneous old-age dependency ratio, computed as the ratio between the total 
number of persons aged 65 or more and the working-age population (and then 
multiplied by 100). According to Lee et.al (2008), a higher share of economically 
inactive dependent population reduces private saving and consequently decreases the 
current account balance.. The fourth control variable is the country's contemporaneous 
openness or trade integration, computed as the sum of exports and imports, expressed in 
percentage points of GDP. According to Chinn and Prasad (2003), the openness ratio 
can reflect the ability that more open economies have to generate foreign exchange 
earnings through exports might be a sign of capacity to reduce its external debt. Finally 
the last variable included in the control set is the contemporaneous growth of Unit 
Labour Costs expressed in percentage points. This variable represent the country's 
competitiveness. Higher values mean that the labour costs of producing one unit of 
output have increased, causing a loss in competitiveness. In additional specifications 
several changes are made: Firstly, the contemporaneous ULC term is replaced by a 
lagged one (II); secondly, it is included the growth rate of Government consumption as 
a share of GDP expressed in percentage points (contemporaneous - III - or lagged - IV), 
in order to better evaluate the relationship between Fiscal policy and current account 
balance. The final specification (V) includes a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if the country is considered a financial center and 0 otherwise. This paper considers that 
the countries with higher financial development within the Euro Area are Ireland and 
the Netherlands.  Table 2 presents the results of the medium-run pooled OLS estimation 
of the basic and alternative specifications: 
17 
 
Table 2: Current Account in percentage points of GDP (Medium Run) 
Variable   (I)   (II)   (III)   (IV)  (V) 
Fiscal Balance   0.46**  0.42**  0.45**  0.48***  0.53*** 
    (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.18) 
Inward FDI North(-1) 0.22***  0.22***  0.21***  0.23***  0.27*** 
    (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Inward FDI South(-1) 0.10  0.10*  0.10  0.14**  0.14* 
    (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Growth of GDP pc.(-1) -0.79**  -0.77**  -0.70*  -0.87**  -0.76* 
   (0.32)  (0.34)  (0.36)  (0.39)  (0.40) 
NFA   0.04**  0.04**  0.05***  0.04**  0.04** 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Old-age Dep. Ratio 0.33  0.29  0.15  0.29  0.51** 
   (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.31)  (0.29)  (0.24) 
Openness   0.07**  0.06**  0.05*  0.06**  0.03 
   (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Growth of ULC  0.10   -  0.11   0.14  0.21 
    (0.12)    (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
Growth of ULC(-1)  -  -0.002   -  -   - 
      (0.10)     
Gov. Consumption   -   -  -0.45*   -   - 
        (0.24) 
Gov. Consumption(-1)  -   -   -  -0.58**  -0.48* 
          (0.27)  (0.28) 
Financial Center   -   -  -  -  4.08** 
            (0.28) 
N  59  59  59  59  59 
R²   0.61  0.61  0.64  0.65  0.68 
Note: Values between parentheses correspond to robust std. errors. *\**\*** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 
percent level respectively. Shapiro-Wilk W test does not reject the null hypothesis that the Residuals follow a normal 
distribution for any estimation. 
 
 Notice that the fiscal balance is statistically significant throughout all conducted 
regressions and its coefficient remains rather constant. The estimated coefficients 
suggest that in the medium run a 1 percent of GDP improvement of the fiscal balance is 
associated with an average of 0.5 percentage points of GDP increase of the current 
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account. However, since both variables are contemporaneous problems could arise from 
endogeneity, which would bias the estimate and make it non interpretable. The usual 
step should be to replace the contemporaneous variable by a lagged term. However, low 
correlation between contemporaneous and lagged values of the fiscal balance make the 
latters poor instruments for the firsts, as also stated by Chinn and Prasad (2003). It 
should also be noticed that this very highly significant correlation between the fiscal 
balance and the current account balance differs from the ones obtained by Abiad et. al 
(2009) and Chinn and Prasad (2003). Their results regarding only industrial or European 
countries suggest that the relationship is non-significant. However they do not provide 
any explanation for that phenomenon.  When the growth of government consumption is 
added to the equation, both contemporaneous and lagged, it always shows a negative 
and significant coefficient, as expected and accordingly to De Gregorio et. al (1994) 
results.  In terms of the effects of inward FDI in the Northern countries, the positive 
coefficients estimated were very similar and extremely significant during all 
regressions. An increase of the inward FDI stock by 1 percent is related with a current 
account balance improvement of around 0.23 percentage points of GDP. In the Southern 
Member States, the relationship also appears to be positive and it is significant in three 
out of five estimations. Even though the Northern countries show a larger coefficient 
than the Southern ones, which helps explaining the divergence between individual 
Member States' external positions, these results do not support Christodoulakis (2009) 
theory, since the coefficient on the Southern countries is not negative. An explanation 
for this is that possibly it is the internal investment that is being misdirected to the non-
tradable sector in the Southern Euro Area, and not the foreign one. In terms of the 
control variables, the NFA coefficient does not change much during all regressions, 
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being statistically significant in all. The growth of real per capita GDP is also significant 
in every estimation and shows a negative coefficient, according to what Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2002) predict. Converging Member states tend to run smaller current account 
balances, since foreign borrowing appears to be optimal. Openness shows a positive and 
significant coefficient (as expected), except in the last regression, which is also the only 
one (V) in which the old-age dependency ratio is statistically significant, even though it 
seems positively correlated with the dependent variable, opposite to what was expected. 
An explanation for the coefficient not being negative could be that since most European 
countries have retirement ages of 65-67 years old, a higher dependency ratio (Ratio of 
people aged 63 or older to working-age population) does not translate immediately into 
a higher share of inactive persons. When this variable is replaced by the age-
dependency ratio (which includes young and old), it also exhibits a positive and highly 
significant coefficient, which is also surprising. Only when it is replaced by the 
dependency ratio (ratio of population to labour force) as in Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2002), it shows a negative and non-significant coefficient. The financial center variable 
shows a large positive and significant coefficient, in the same line with the result 
obtained by Lee et. al (2008). 
Short-Run Estimation 
  Once the medium term relationship is established, it is also useful to estimate 
the link between the current account balance and both fiscal policy and inward Foreign 
Direct Investment in the short-run. This way, the basic specification is given by: 
 
  
   
     
   
      
       
        
                                            
                               (2)  
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 Since what we are now estimating is a short-run relationship, the data set is 
composed by yearly data and only considers the "Euro period" (1999-2009). In order to 
avoid endogeneity, all independent variables are lagged one year. The short-run 
estimation has several control variables in common with the medium-run estimation: the 
growth rate of Real PPP-adjusted per capita GDP, the old-age dependency ratio, 
openness and the growth rate of ULC. The new control variables added are: the output 
gap, expressed in percentage points of  potential GDP, in order to control for the 
business cycle; and the growth rate of real oil prices (in Real Euros) expressed in 
percentage points, since all Euro Area countries are net oil importers shifts in oil prices 
could negatively affect the current account balance. In an alternative specification (II), 
the growth rate of ULC is replaced by the growth rate of the Real Effective Exchange 
Rate (REER), based on ULC, and expressed in percentage points. The higher this 
indicator is, the greater is the loss of competitiveness relatively to its trading partners. In 
estimations III and IV it is respectively added the lagged growth rate of Government 
consumption as a share of GDP (expressed in percentage points) and the financial center 
dummy. In estimation V, the old-age dependency ratio is replaced by the age 
dependency ratio, (ratio of population aged 0-14 and 63 or older to working-age 
population, multiplied by 100). Table 3 presents the results of the short-run pooled OLS 
estimations. 
Table 3: Current Account in percentage points of GDP (short-run) 
Variable   (I)   (II)   (III)   (IV)  (V) 
Fiscal Balance (-1) 0.89***  0.90***  0.86***  0.88***  0.83*** 
    (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.16) 
Inward FDI North(-1) 0.02  0.04  0.02  0.05*  0.05 
    (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Inward FDI South(-1) 0.02  0.03  0.02  0.05  0.05 
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     (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Growth of GDP pc. (-1) -0.40  -0.39  -0.43  -0.41  -0.40 
    (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.29)  (0.27)  (0.37) 
Old-age Dep. Ratio (-1) 0.58***  0.62***  0.58***  0.81***   - 
   (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.10) 
Openness(-1)  0.07***  0.07***  0.07***  0.03**  0.01 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Growth of ULC(-1) -0.94***  -  -0.77**               -0.81*** -1.10** 
     (0.29)    (0.33)  (0.30)  (0.46) 
Output Gap (-1)  -0.22  -0.26  -0.23  -0.32  -0.18 
    (0.28)  (0.29)  (0.26)  (0.27)  (0.38) 
Growth of Real Oil P.(-1) 1.17***  1.35***  1.30***  1.48***  1.32*** 
     (0.15)  (0.34)  (0.15)  (0.33)  (0.48) 
Growth of REER(-1)  -  -0.10   -   -   - 
      (0.10)   
Gov. Consumption(-1)  -  -  -0.18  -0.23*  -0.27 
         (0.17)  (0.14)  (0.16) 
Financial Center   -   -  -  7.10***  3.93** 
          (1.18)  (1.60) 
Age Dep. Ratio (-1)  -   -   -   -  -0.74 
            (0.52) 
N  96  96  96  96  96 
R²   0.71  0.69  0.72  0.80  0.66 
Note: Values between parentheses correspond to robust std. errors. *\**\*** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 
percent level respectively. Shapiro-Wilk W test does not reject the null hypothesis that the Residuals follow a normal 
distribution for any estimation. 
 
 The results are clear and rather constant throughout all estimations. The Fiscal 
balance variable is extremely statistically significant and with a high positive 
coefficient. This coefficient is even larger than the one presented in the medium term 
regression, suggesting that fiscal policy would have a larger impact on the current 
account in the short run. The growth of government consumption appears to be once 
more negatively related with the current account balance, even though it is only 
significant (at 10%) when we also include the financial center dummy. In the short run 
22 
 
the growth of real per capita GDP does not appear to be related to the current account, 
contrary to what happens in the medium run. Openness and the growth of ULC are 
statistically significant and their coefficient have the expected signs. Two intriguing 
puzzles also emerge from the last three specifications, regarding the old-age dependency 
ratio and the real oil price. The first case was already discussed above, even though now 
it is extremely significant. However, when it is replaced by general age-dependency 
ratio this positive effect disappears. The new coefficient is negative and not statistically 
significant. The fact that the real oil price has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient is also a surprise, since we are only considering Euro Area Member States 
and neither one of them is an oil net exporter. Therefore, the real oil price should have a 
negative and not positive coefficient. In terms of the effects of inward FDI, once again it 
does not appear to support Christodoulakis (2009) theory. In all specifications, the 
coefficient on the Southern countries inward FDI was positive, even though it was also 
always not statistically significant. The coefficient for the Northern Member States is 
only statistically significant on the fourth regression and remains positive, supporting 
the theory that in the North inward FDI is being directed to the tradable sector. The fact 
that its coefficient is much smaller than in the medium run estimation also suggests that 
the effects of inward Foreign Direct Investment are stronger in the medium than in the 
short term, what can make sense since production could still take some time to adjust. 
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IV - Conclusion 
 Even though that in a currency union the concept of current account becomes 
somehow "blurred", it should not be ignored as large imbalances could have dangerous 
consequences on the individual Member States economies and to the viability of the 
euro. The common currency helped peripheral countries to keep their investment levels 
despite lower private savings by improving their access to other Member States' 
savings. Fiscal Policy appears to be related to the current account balance both in the 
short and medium run. Higher public savings are associated with a higher current 
account balance. Inward Foreign Direct Investment appears to have contributed to the 
divergence in the Euro Area individual Member States' external accounts, since it seems 
to have a positive effect on the current account balance in the Northern countries and 
none on the Southern Member States. This result suggests that inward FDI has been 
mainly directed to the tradable sector in the North, while in the South it is possible that 
the non-tradable sector has been attracting most of the internal (and not foreign) 
investment. 
 The path of adjustment for Member States with large current account deficits 
seems clear and extremely difficult. With no exchange rate policy, the options are not 
that many. Fiscal policy appears to be a valid instrument, especially a fiscal 
consolidation strategy based on the expenditure side, according to the results obtained in 
this paper. The Government could also perform a fiscal devaluation, a neutral tax-swap 
between Employer's payroll taxes and consumption taxes, in order for labour to become 
cheaper for domestic firms and boost competitiveness. Franco (2010) showed that this 
policy can only be successful if followed by wage moderation. Structural reforms to 
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enhance productivity in both the tradable and non-tradable sectors must also be on the 
agenda. Structural reforms on labour and product markets (this last especially on the 
non-tradable sector, in order to enable lower inflation rates) are crucial to reduce these 
large external imbalances. 
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Data Appendix. 
Sources: 
Current Account Balance IMF 
Fiscal Balance AMECO 
Government Consumption OECD 
Real PPP-adjusted per capita GDP OECD 
NFA 
Updated and extended version of 
dataset constructed by Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) 
Old-age Dependency Ratio World Bank 
Age Dependency Ratio World Bank 
Openness World Bank 
ULC OECD 
Real Exchange Rate (vs. IC36) AMECO 
Inward Foreign Direct Investment 
Stock 
UNCTAD 
Output Gap IMF 
Oil Price ECB 
GDP Deflator Eurostat 
Capital and Labour inputs (industry 
detailed) 
EU KLEMS 
Real Gross Value Added (Industry 
detailed) 
Eurostat 
 
